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BIOTERRORISM OR AVIAN INFLUENZA: CALIFORNIA,
THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS
ACT, AND PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES DURING A
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
N. PIETER M. O'LEARY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought home for
many people the need for increased national security.1 The world be-
came a different place after the end of the Cold War; the new enemies
to the American way of life were radical ideologues, religious zealots,
and homegrown ultra-patriots.2 The nation's safety and stability had
to be protected against future attacks from any of these groups and
from the various means with which they chose to attack the American
government and people.3
Even before the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
States had been preparing for the eventualities of a devastating terror-
ist attack upon the country.4 After all, terror attacks come in many
* J.D., California Western School of Law; M.A. Pepperdine University; B.A. Wilfrid
Laurier University. The author wishes to thank Professor Susan Channick for her insight and
for reviewing the initial draft of this article. Further, thanks to Kathryn Caretti, Jodi Konotri,
and Elisabeth Trefonas for their valuable editorial suggestions. Finally, this article is dedi-
cated to the foreign lawyers and judges enrolled in California Western School of Law's
LL.M. & M.C.L. programs. Their curiosity, intelligence, and congeniality are an inspiration.
1. See Richard A. Serrano et al., America Attacked: New York City, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2001, at A3.
2. See generally Bruce Hoffman, Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Ter-
rorism Begs for Broader U.S. Policy, RAND REVIEW, Winter 1998-1999, available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/frr.winter98.9/methods.html.
3. See Serrano et al., supra note 1.
4. Ali S. Khan & David A. Ashford, Ready or Not-Preparedness for Bioterrorism, 345
NEW ENG. J. MED. 287, 288 (2001); David P. Fidler, Caught Between Paradise and Power:
Public Health, Pathogenic Threats, and the Axis of Illness, 35 MCGEORGE L. REv. 45, 83-85
(2004) (discussing the federal government's views and strategies regarding bioterrorist at-
1
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shapes and sizes. One particular type of attack authorities focused on
in the weeks following September 11, 2001, was the intentional re-
lease of a biological agent: a bioterror attack. The anthrax attacks of
October 2001 heightened the nation's fear of a biological terror attack
and revealed the ease with which such an attack could take place.6
With a biological agent like anthrax, there is no need for a daring, co-
ordinated takeover of a commercial airliner. Rather, a lone individual
could perpetrate a bioterror attack using the country's own postal sys-
tem.7 The October 2001 anthrax attacks exposed the near-complete
lack of preparedness and resulting confusion such acts of terrorism
could have on the country.
Natural occurrences of diseases, however, also raise concern
about the nation's level of preparedness. New viral outbreaks, such as
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 9 highlight the danger of
virulent viruses and the speed with which they may be spread around
tacks in the late 1990s). Moreover, a report compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention addressed the vulnerability of the United States to biological and chemical attack.
ALl S. KHAN ET AL., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
TERRORISM: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE (2000), available at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Documents/BTSratplan.pdf.
5. For a definition of bioterror, see THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS
ACT art. I, § 104 (a) (Ctr. for Law & the Pub.'s Health, Draft for Discussion 2001), available
at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
6. E.g., Guy Gugliotta, Anthrax Tainted Up to 5,000 Letters: Cross-Contamination
Blamed for Deaths of 2 Women, WASH. POST, May 14, 2002, at A2; Peter Slevin, No Consen-
sus on Who Wrote Anthrax Letters: Experts' Speculation Covers a Broad Range, WASH.
POST, Oct. 25, 2001, at A23. See generally WENDY BARNABY, THE PLAGUE MAKERS: THE
SECRET WORLD OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 2-6 (3d ed., Continuum 2002) (1999) (discussing
the nature of the letters, the anthrax strain identified and the repercussions of the anthrax letter
attacks).
7. A profile of the anthrax mailer composed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
identified the mailer as "a man in the U.S." and "probably a loner with a scientific back-
ground." FBI Laments Lack of Anthrax Arrests, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002, at A25.
8. Matthew E. Brown, Reconsidering the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:
Toward State Regionalization in Bioterrorism Response, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 95, 96
(2005).
9. Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health Emergencies:
Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 19 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 380 (2003). SARS first appeared in Foshan City, Guangdong Prov-
ince, China in November 2002. Paul Arshagouni, An Introduction to Medical Issues Posed by
International Health Threats in a Legal Framework, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 199, 202 (2004).
Although SARS spread to nearly thirty countries around the world, the United States only re-
ported eight people testing positive for infection and no deaths. Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Fact Sheet: Basic Information About SARS,
May 3, 2005, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/factsheet.htm. Currently, many
view SARS as the "dress-rehearsal" for a truly global threat like avian influenza. THOMAS
ABRAHAM, TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PLAGUE: THE STORY OF SARS 140 (John Hopkins Univ.
Press 2005) (2004).
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the globe.'° SARS spread from rural China to the hospitals of metro-
politan Toronto, Canada, in four months and ultimately resulted in
over 8,000 cases and nearly 800 deaths in twenty-seven countries."
While not the pandemic many government and medical officials
feared, the SARS experience represented a global threat due to its vi-
rility, 12 speed of dispersion, 3 and impact on medical care around the
world.14 Consequently, both the fear of bioterror attacks and the reali-
zation that newly emerging viruses can disrupt the functioning of gov-
ernment, moved officials to address the issue of governing during and
immediately after either type of event.
Moreover, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, "one of the worst
natural disasters in our nation's history," and the threat posed by dis-
ease outbreak, the need for improved disaster relief preparedness re-
mains evident. 15 Under the direction of Mike Leavitt, Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services, the federal government
declared a public health emergency in the affected region.'6 With
floodwaters contaminated by sewage and decaying dead bodies, the
threat of mosquito-borne disease, 17 as well as cholera, dysentery, and
other infections, posed a fundamental risk to security and the cleanup
process.' Although the federal government eventually appeared to
10. Robert A. Weinstein, Planning for Epidemics-The Lessons of SARS, 350 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2332 (2004).
11. Id.
12. The overall death rate for SARS was approximately nine percent globally. Ar-
shagouni, supra note 9, at 201. Young adults had an average death rate of approximately
three percent and the average death rate in the elderly was about fifty percent. Id.
13. Obijiofor Aginam, Between Isolationism and Mutual Vulnerability: A South-North
Perspective on Global Governance of Epidemics in an Age of Globalization, 77 TEMP. L.
REV. 297, 307 (2004). The term "Jet-Spread" has been used to describe the swift travel of an
infectious disease virus by airplane. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE
EPIDEMIC THAT NEVER WAS: POLICY-MAKING AND THE SWINE FLU SCARE 28 (rev. ed., Vintage
Books 1983) (1982).
14. See ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 135-36.
15. James Gerstenzang, Katrina's Rising Toll: Bush Calls for Massive, Coordinated
Recovery, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A21 (quoting President George W. Bush). Unless the
natural disaster involves the potential for a public health emergency involving a significant
number of deaths due to disease, invoking the powers of the Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act is unwarranted. Accordingly, use of the Model Act in situations such as the
Northridge, California earthquake in 1994 or the 2003 Cedar fires in San Diego, California
would be inappropriate.
16. Id.
17. The two primary mosquito-borne threats are the West Nile and Easter Equine En-
cephalitis viruses. Jessica Heslam, Katrina's Wrath: Health Crisis Looms in Bayou, BOSTON
HERALD, Sept. 1, 2005, at 2.
18. Thomas H. Maugh lI & Ellen Barry, Katrina's Rising Toll: Healthcare Feeling the
Strain, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at A19.
2006]
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lead the recovery efforts, constitutionally, state governments have a
great role in addressing public health emergencies in their territories.19
In addressing these types of threats, it is important to note that in
the United States the responsibility for safeguarding public health falls
largely to the states under their police powers.2 ° Under the Tenth
Amendment, "powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."21 Accordingly, in attempting to draft
legislation necessary to protect the public safety during either a bioter-
ror attack or during a large-scale outbreak of an infectious disease,
planners focused on the powers of state officials to quell the threat.22
The result was the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (Model
Act), upon which many states now base their legislation. 23  Although
many see the Model Act as a significant attempt to protect the public,
opponents view it as a monumental threat to the civil liberties of all
Americans, including Californians.24 The power to isolate or quaran-
tine individuals simply thought to be infected, compel the collection
and reporting of a person's private health information, appropriate
vaccines and medications, and even force persons identified as health
risks to undergo treatment is too much for many who criticize the
broad authority granted under the Model Act.25
This Article highlights government efforts, specifically Califor-
nia's, in managing either a large-scale bioterror attack or a swift mov-
ing, naturally-occurring, infectious disease threat such as SARS or
19. Joseph Barrera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in
the United States, in BIOTERRORISM: GUIDELINES FOR MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH
MANAGEMENT 221, 222-23 (Donald A. Henderson et al. eds., 2002). Local outbreaks of in-
fectious disease are under the authority of local or state public health authorities; however, the
federal government has authority to combat the transmission of infectious disease when the
infection moves across state lines. Id.
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Barrera et al., supra note 19, at 222-23.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
22. However, Ken Wing argues the federal government, specifically Congress, would
have authority over a large scale health emergency, because "[a]nthrax doesn't respect state
borders .... Whatever public health emergency we experience in Washington is likely to be
a problem in Oregon and Idaho and, for that matter, Canada as well." Ken Wing, Policy
Choices and Model Acts: Preparing for the Next Public Health Emergency, 13 HEALTH
MATRIX 71, 82 (2003). Moreover, Wing believes the Model Act should be enacted as a piece
of federal legislation rather than as state law. Id.
23. Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantine Redux: Bioterrorism, AIDS and the Curtailment of
Individual Liberty in the Name of Public Health, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 85, 86 (2003); THE
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Ctr. for Law & the Pub.'s Health, Draft for
Discussion 2001), available at httpl/www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
24. Reich, supra note 9, at 381.
25. Thomas May, Political Authority in a Bioterror Emergency, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
159, 161 (2004).
252 [Vol. 42
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avian influenza. In light of the recent disaster in Louisiana and the
ever-spreading threat of avian influenza, California must reconsider its
own level of preparedness. Preparedness, however, must be tempered
with a respect for long-held constitutional values, which many argue
are jeopardized by vague, overbroad legislation designed to quell a
public health emergency.
Thus, this Article focuses on balancing state authority with pro-
tecting civil liberties during a public health crisis. Specifically, if
California passes legislation based on the Model Act, it must temper
the authority granted to the state government with clear protections
enshrined in the legislation and provide clear protections for Califor-
nians' rights. Part II briefly identifies the causes and concerns that
may prompt a state governor to invoke the authority provided under
the Model Act, whether bioterror attack or naturally occurring infec-
tious disease outbreak. Part II also provides a brief history of recent
threats. Part III highlights the Model Act and overviews key aspects
of its development. Additionally, Part III focuses on events ranging
from pre-September 11, 2001 bioterror training exercises, to the draft-
ing of the Model Act. The bioterror exercises provide a foundation
for understanding the Model Act, upon which California based its pro-
posed public health emergency legislation in both 2002 and 2006.
Part IV explores California's attempts to adopt detailed legislation
in 2002 based on the Model Act. Although the legislation was never
passed, Part IV chronicles various bioterror training exercises, the key
aspects of the 2002 California proposal, its most contentious aspects,
as well as highlights key federal and state cases upholding broad state
authority to act during a public health emergency. Part V briefly ex-
amines the more general California legislation proposed in February
2006, aimed at rectifying various criticisms of the 2002 proposal and
paving the way to adopting a comprehensive plan to guide the state
through a public health emergency. Finally, Part VI enumerates sev-
eral recommendations California officials should consider with re-
spect to the Model Act, including enshrining civil liberties protections
within any future legislation and training judges to respond to state au-
thority challenges during a large-scale public health emergency.
II. IDENTIFYING THE NATURE OF THE THREAT
Drafters of the Model Act recognized two primary biological
threats: acts of bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious dis-
2006]
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ease.26 Under the Model Act, a governor may declare a "state of pub-
lic health emergency, ' 27 thus prompting state government officials to
act. A public health emergency is defined as "an occurrence or immi-
nent threat of an illness or health condition . . . caused by bio-
terrorism ... [or] novel or previously controlled or eradicated infec-
tious agent or biological toxin," posing a significant risk of high mor-
tality. 28 How this definition applies in reality, however, may best be
understood by reviewing several historical examples addressing acts
of bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks.
A. Acts of Bioterrorism
While fears concerning biological weapon proliferation have in-
creased since the 1990s, 29 thankfully there has been no major bioterror
attack in the United States.30 The most noteworthy example of an at-
tack was perpetrated by the Japanese religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo
(Aum), in 1995. 31 Former Japanese parliamentary candidate, Shoko
Ashahara, led Aum and managed to accumulate $1.5 billion in dona-
tions and investments.3 2 Under the direction of Ashahara, Aum devel-
oped and experimented with a variety of biological agents in the
1990s. 33 After failed attempts to release anthrax and botulin toxin,
26. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public
Health and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 6 (2003).
27. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT art. IV, § 401 (Ctr. for Law
& the Pub.'s Health, Draft for Discussion 2001), available at http//www.publichealth-
law.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
28. Id. § 104(m).
29. Fidler, supra note 4, at 83.
30. See Brown, supra note 8, at 105-06. Brown discusses the difficulty associated with
acquiring, producing, and distributing a biological agent. l; see also JEFFREY D. SIMON, THE
TERRORIST TRAP: AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH TERRORISM 360 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing the
uncertainty and the potential for personal injury result in a "reluctance to experiment with un-
familiar weapons" on the part of would-be terrorists).
31. Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are Limitations
on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REv. 1105, 1121 (2003). Aum
Shinrikyo, however, had been trying to carry out a large-scale attack using various biological
agents since the late 1980s. Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Pre-
venting Catastrophe, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 417, 425-26 (2001). In 1990, Aum tried to
attack the Japanese parliament using a botulinum toxin aerosol spray. Id. at 425. In 1992,
Aum sent a group to Zaire to obtain a sample of Ebola that it later hoped to return to Japan.
Id. In 1993, the cult attempted an attack during the wedding of the Japanese crown prince.
Id. Also during 1993, the cult tried to spray anthrax spores from a building in Tokyo. Id. All
of these attacks were unsuccessful. Id
32. Kyle B. Olson, Aur Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASE 513, 514 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4
/pdf/olson.pdf.
33. Id.
6
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Aum focused on sarin nerve gas.34 Consequently, on March 20, 1995,
Aum conducted a coordinated attack on the Japanese subway system
resulting in twelve deaths and injuring over 5,000 people.3 5
The first modem, yet more minor, bioterrorist attack in the United
States occurred in 1984, when members of an Oregon-based Ra-
jneeshee cult "contaminate[d] salad bars in an Oregon town with sal-
monella."36 Their purpose was to incapacitate voters in a local elec-
tion, and the attack resulted in more than 750 people becoming
seriously ill. 37
Despite these two examples and the October 2001 anthrax attacks,
there are no recent cases of a major bioterrorist attack.3 8 However, the
devastating events of September 11, 2001 have spurred federal au-
thorities and state government officials to prepare for and prevent a
possibly devastating bioterrorist attack from occurring and to prepare
to manage events immediately after one occurs.
B. Naturally Occurring Infectious Disease
Infectious disease is the other type of biological threat the Model
Act's drafters envisioned. Some argue naturally occurring infectious
disease represents the greatest threat, considering the severity of past
outbreaks and the speed with which a present-day outbreak can be
transmitted.39  For example, the influenza outbreak of 1918-1919 is
considered by some historians and epidemiologists to be the most
34. Id. at 513-14. For a detailed description of the characteristics of Sarin, see Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Facts About Sarin, May 17,
2005, available at http://www.bt. cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/facts.asp.
35. Kellman, supra note 31, at 425. For a detailed description of the 1995 subway at-
tack, see BARNABY, supra note 6, at 39-41.
36. History of Biological Warfare: Anthrax, Other Organisms Used for Centuries as
Weapons of War (National Public Radio broadcast Oct. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/response/anthrax/features/200 1/oct/0 11018.bioterrorism.his
tory.html.
37. Id.
38. Several notable arrests of individuals possessing biological agents, however, have
been made over the years. For instance, in 1972, "members of a right-wing group known as
'Order of the Rising Sun' were arrested in Chicago with between 30 and 40kg of typhoid bac-
teria cultures which they were going to use to poison water supplies" to create a "master
race." BARNABY, supra note 6, at 43. In 1995, a tax protest group called the Patriots Council
was found in possession of 0.7 grams of ricin. Id. Further, a member of a white supremacist
group was arrested and charged with mail fraud after trying to acquire freeze dried bacteria
that cause pneumonic and bubonic plague. Id.
39. See generally LAURIE GARRETr, THE COMING PLAGUE: NEWLY EMERGING DISEASE
IN A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE (Penguin Books1995) (1994); WILLIAM H. McNEILL, PLAGUES
AND PEOPLES (Anchor Books 1998) (1977).
2006] 255
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devastating outbreak of infectious disease in history.4° While esti-
mates vary, some believe over one billion people were infected 41 and
nearly fifty million people died during an outbreak that lasted ap-
proximately one year.42 In comparison, today in the United States
about five to twenty percent of the population contracts the flu each
year. 43  Approximately 200,000 people are hospitalized due to their
symptoms and about 36,000 die in the United States each year due to
the flu.'
Currently, international attention is focused on the spread of avian
influenza among poultry and humans in Asia and Europe.45 The threat
from the current H5N14 strain of avian influenza raises concern be-
40. See JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPic STORY OF THE DEADLIEST
PLAGUE IN HISTORY 4 (2004); see also N. Pieter M. O'Leary, The 1918-1919 Influenza Epi-
demic in Los Angeles, 86 S. CAL. QUARTERLY 391 (2004).
41. GARRETT, supra note 39, at 158.
42. Estimates on the number of deaths vary from forty to one hundred million. BARRY,
supra note 40, at 4; Helen Branswell, Flu Pandemic Near, Experts Fear, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL, Nov. 17, 2004, at Al; Gretchen Reynolds, The Flu Hunters, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 7;
2004, at 37, 39.
43. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Fact Sheet: Key Facts About Influenza and
Influenza Vaccine, Sept. 28, 2005, available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/keyfacts.htm.
44. Id.
45. Klaus St6hr, Avian Influenza and Pandemics-Research Needs and Opportunities,
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 405, 405-07 (2005). Avian influenza is an infectious disease occurring
in birds. See World Health Org., Avian Influenza-Fact Sheet: Avian Influenza ("Bird Flu")
and the Significance of Its Transmission to Humans, COMMUNICABLE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE
& RESPONSE, Jan. 15, 2004, http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_01_15/en/. It is "caused by
type A strains of the influenza virus." Id First identified in Italy more than 100 years ago,
the current outbreak was first noted in Hong Kong where it infected eighteen people, killing
six. Id. The 1997 avian influenza deaths in Hong Kong resulted in the culling of Hong
Kong's entire poultry population, about 1.5 million birds. Id. The infection of humans, how-
ever, "marked the first time that an avian influenza virus was transmitted directly to humans
and caused severe illness with high mortality." Id. The avian influenza crisis continues to
spread through Asia and has recently spread via migratory birds to Europe and Africa. See
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Outbreaks: Avian
Influenza: Current Situation, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianl outbreaks/current.htm (last visited
May 12, 2006). As of May 5, 2006, there have been 114 deaths and 206 cases of avian influ-
enza. World Health Org., Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza
AI(H5N1) Reported to WHO, EPIDEMIC & PANDEMIC ALERT & RESPONSE, May 5, 2006,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avianinfluenza/coun-
try/cases table_2006 05 05/en/index.html. For a thorough overview of the avian influenza
issue, see generally Tim Appenzeller, Tracking the Next Killer Flu, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct.
2005, at 2.
46. Avian influenza is an "A" strain of influenza. HSN1 refers to the surface proteins
on the virus, hemagglutinin and neuraminidase. GINA KOLATA, THE FLU: THE STORY OF THE
GREAT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF 1918 AND THE SEARCH FOR THE VIRUS THAT CAUSED IT 86-87
(1999). Recently, researchers have addressed various similarities and differences between the
1918-1919 influenza strain and the current avian influenza strain. For example, both viruses
moved directly from birds to humans without requiring passage through other animals, such
as pigs. Charles Piller, Killer 1918 Flu Gives Clues to New Virus, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005,
at Al. Differences between the two viruses also exist. The avian influenza strain currently
8
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cause of its spread among poultry in Asia, Africa, and Europe, despite
efforts to contain it.47 Further, signs of animal-to-human as well as
sporadic human-to-human transmission raise great concern.48  As of
May 5, 2006, there have been 206 human cases of avian influenza
with 114 deaths reported since December 2003. 41 Should avian influ-
enza continue to spread among poultry in Asia and the virus mutate to
allow easier human-to-human transmission, the potential for global
pandemic would be drastically increased.50 Estimates indicate an out-
break of pandemic avian influenza would last between twelve and
thirty-six months. 5' Further, global mortality rates from such an out-
break are estimated at between 180 and 360 million people. 2 As one
expert noted, the declaration that a pandemic was underway "would
change the world overnight. 53
Avian influenza currently represents the type of naturally occur-
ring infectious disease5 4 drafters of the Model Act considered when
setting out to compose a method to empower state government offi-
cials during an outbreak.
III. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT
In the late 1990s, it was the increasing threat posed by bioterror-
ism, rather than infectious disease, which concerned most public
health and government officials.55 This concern was significantly
has difficulty passing directly from human to human, while the 1918-1919 strain had little
difficulty. Id. Moreover, the 1918-1919 strain primarily attacked the lungs of its victims. Id.
The current avian influenza strain, however, infects other internal organs as well. Id.
47. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 45; Animal and Human Health:
Sitting Ducks, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16-22, 2005, at 35.
48. See James Hookway, Bad Diagnosis: In Rural Cambodia, Avian Influenza Finds a
Weak Spot, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2005, at Al; Reynolds, supra note 42, at 38-39.
49. World Health Org., Cumulative Number, supra note 45. Of the 206 cases, there
have been ninety-three cases in Vietnam, twenty-two in Thailand, six in Cambodia, and
thirty-two in Indonesia. Id.
50. See St6hr, supra note 45.
51. Michael T. Osterholm, Preparing for the Next Pandemic, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 24, 24-
26 (2005).
52. Id. Current estimates indicate that if a virus with the mortality rate of the 1918-
1919 influenza virus reached pandemic levels, an estimated 1.7 million Americans would die.
Id. Untold numbers would fall ill, and health care providers would be overwhelmed. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Laurie Garrett, The Next Pandemic?, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 3, 3-4 (2005).
55. Other than the obvious focus on avoiding another terrorist attack akin to the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks, another explanation for the focus on bioterrorism, rather than infec-
tious disease outbreaks, is the Swine Flu epidemic of 1976. See generally GARRETr, supra
note 39, at 153-91; Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517, 1519 (10th Cir. 1984). The
Swine Flu scare erupted in early 1976 when several young men at Fort Dix, New Jersey, be-
9
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heightened in the wake of September 11, 2001, which made the threat
of bioterror far more real. After reports of Iraqi attempts to develop a
bio-weapons program,56 the actions of Aum Shinrikyo in Japan,57 and
the collapse of the Soviet Union with its large stores of bio-weapons,58
American officials seemed to have believed the true threat lay in a
bioterror attack.59 Accordingly, state and federal government officials
conducted two primary simulations of a bioterror attack in the United
States: Operation TOPOFF and operation Dark Winter. 6° Based on
the information gathered during these simulations and the later Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks, authorities focused on and drafted legislation
to manage the twin threats of attack and disease.
A. Exercises in Bioterrorism
In the months prior to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, fed-
eral and state health officials conducted two extensive tests simulating
bioterror attacks. In Denver, Colorado, the first exercise, Operation
TOPOFF, was conducted between May 20 and May 23, 2000.61
TOPOFF was a "national-level, multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional,
'real-time,' limited-notice WMD [weapons of mass destruction] re-
sponse exercise. During the course of the exercise, participants
learned that plague had been released in the city three days earlier. 63
In response to the release of plague, many parts of the medical and
gan complaining of respiratory ailments. NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 13, at 17. Ulti-
mately, a national vaccination program was implemented to stave off the perceived threat of a
national epidemic. KOLATA, supra note 46, at 164-65. The vaccination program, however,
was later perceived as an overreaction by the Carter Administration. See LAWRENCE 0.
GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, REsTRAINT 186-87 (2000). Moreover, when
reports of illness and death were linked to the nationwide vaccination program, exaggerated
media attention worked to undermine the program, and it was subsequently scrapped. Id.
Consequently, today few officials want to raise the false alarm about an epidemic that will
never materialize. See generally NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 13, at 116-37.
56. See BARNABY, supra note 6, at 57-73.
57. See supra Part I.A.
58. See Tim Goodman, A Chilling Look at Bioterrorism: Germs of Mass Destruction
Under "Nova" Microscope, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 13, 2001, at D1; Kellman, supra note 31, at
423.
59. See Fidler, supra note 4, at 83.
60. James F. Childress, Triage and Response to a Bioterrorist Attack, in IN THE WAKE
OF TERROR: MEDICINE AND MORTALITY IN A TIME OF CRisIS 77, 90 (Jonathan D. Moreno ed.,
2003).
61. Id. at 90. Operation TOPOFF stands for "Top Officials." See U.S. Dep't of State,
TOPOFF (Top Officials) (July 24, 2002), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/12129.htm.
62. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 61.
63. Childress, supra note 60, at 90.
10
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public health system went into action.' 4 Denver area hospitals, local
law enforcement, county and state health agencies, the "CDC [Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention], the Public Health Service, and
the Office of Emergency Preparedness" were all involved in the re-
sponse to the simulated attack.65 The result demonstrated "serious
weakness" in the nation's "public health system. '66 Efforts to contain
the spread of the simulated attack and treat more than 4,000 cases
were slowed by individuals who fled the city. 67 Further, lack of facili-
ties and supplies contributed to nearly 2,000 deaths and revealed a
lack of clear lines of communication and authority in handling the cri-
sis. 68  More relevant questions of who had authority to impose cur-
fews, quarantine sick individuals, and regulate city and state borders
highlighted the realization that greater preparedness was required.69
Since the original May 2000 TOPOFF exercise, TOPOFF 270 and
TOPOFF 371 have taken place. Both subsequent simulated exercises
64. See Thomas V. Inglesby, Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins Univ. Sch. of Med.,
Lessons from TOPOFF (Nov. 29, 2000).
65. Id.
66. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Plan-
ning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Disease, 288 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N 622, 623 (2002).
67. May, supra note 25, at 160. Some individuals fled Denver for surrounding states
and even foreign countries, thereby drastically increasing the potential spread of the outbreak.
Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., "TOPOFF 2": Week-Long National
Combating Terrorism Exercise Begins May 12, 2003 (May 5, 2003),
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=735. TOPOFF 2 began on May 12, 2003, at
3:00 p.m. EDT, and involved the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Depart-
ment of State, in cooperation with federal, state, and local governments, as well as the Cana-
dian government. Id. The exercise was conducted over five days and simulated how the
United States "would respond in the event of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attack."
Id. The exercise consisted of simulated attacks in Chicago and Seattle. Id
The State of Washington, King County, and the City of Seattle re-
spond[ed] to a hypothetical explosion containing radioactive material.
The State of Illinois, Cook, Lake, DuPage and Kane Counties, and the
City of Chicago respond[ed] to a covert release of a biological agent.
Nineteen Federal agencies and the American Red Cross [were also in-
volved, as was the] ... Government of Canada, including the Province of
British Columbia and the City of Vancouver. Id.
71. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., The TOPOFF 3 Full-Scale Exercise,
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublicinterapp/editorial/editorial_0594.xml (last visited Apr. 24,
2006). TOPOFF 3 was conducted "April 4-8, 2005 and involve[d] more than 10,000 partici-
pants representing more than 200 Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and international
agencies and organizations and volunteer groups." Id. Again, the purpose was to test the "na-
tional and international response to a large-scale, multipoint terrorist attack." Id. A simu-
lated chemical attack was conducted in New London, Connecticut, and a biological attack
was conducted in Union and Middlesex counties, New Jersey. Id. Further, the governments
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revealed further need to increase national and international coopera-
tion in treating the sick, stemming the spread of an outbreak, and es-
tablishing clear lines of authority in managing the health crisis.72
The second simulated exercise of note was Dark Winter, which
took place in 2001. 73 Dark Winter was a two-day simulated outbreak
of smallpox originating in an "American city" and later spreading to
twenty-five other states and fifteen other countries.74 The simulated
exercise resulted in over 16,000 cases of smallpox in the United States
alone and revealed many of the same shortcomings noted in the
TOPOFF exercise.75 Of further note were questions of who possessed
authority to close city and state borders, call for vaccination of the
public, quarantine sick individuals, and generally insure public coop-
eration.76
Based on these simulated exercises, officials realized a clear line
of authority needed to be established.7 7 Because local healthcare pro-
viders and state emergency officials would be the first responders in
the event of a bioterror attack or naturally occurring outbreak of dis-
ease,78 legislation had to be drafted to empower states to handle a local
outbreak while also protecting national security.
B. Genesis of the Model Act
The Model Act was born out of the earlier exercises, which dem-
onstrated a need to maintain governmental control during a bioterror
of Canada and the United Kingdom were involved. Id.
72. See generally Michel Chossudovsky, Is America Preparing for Martial Law?, CTR.
FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALISATION, Apr. 10, 2005, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/
CHO504B.html; Donna Young, States, Hospitals Learn Emergency-Preparedness Lessons in
TOPOFF 3, 62 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1000, 1002-04 (2005), available at
http://www.ajhp.org/cgi/reprint/62/10/1000.pdf.
73. Childress, supra note 60, at 90-91.
74. Lorena Matei, Quarantine Revision and the Model State Emergency Health Powers
Act: "Law for the Common Good," 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 433, 433-
34(2002).
75. See id. Noted observations included unfamiliarity with the character of bioterrorist
attacks, lack of sufficient supplies and surge capacity in hospitals, conflicting authority be-
tween state and federal decision makers, and the response of local citizens to a bioterror at-
tack. Id.; Nat'l Mem'l Inst. for the Prevention of Terrorism, Dark Winter,
http://www.mipt.org/ darkwinter06222001.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
76. See Nat'l Mem'l Inst. for the Prevention of Terrorism, supra note 75; Childress,
supra note 60, at 91.
77. May, supra note 25, at 160.
78. Marlene Cimons, Doctors Warned on Bioterrorism, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2000, at
[Vol. 42
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attack.79 The Model Act was designed to "grant state officials the au-
thority necessary to coordinate an effective response to biological ter-
ror"80 and naturally occurring health threats.
In response to growing concern about the likelihood of a large-
scale bioterror attack and in light of the anthrax attack in October
2001,81 "the General Counsel for the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) invited the Center for Law and Public's Health
(CLPH), a public health resource center run by Georgetown and John
Hopkins Universities, to draft a model emergency response code. 82
Additionally, a large contingent of state level organizations, such as
"the National Governors Association, the National Conference of
State Legislatures, the Association of State and Territorial Health Of-
ficials, the National Association of City and County Health Officials,
and the National Association of Attorneys General," provided input
into the initial draft.83 It took less than four weeks to compose the first
draft of the Act, which was submitted to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Tommy Thompson, in October 2001.8
The Model Act represents the method individual states may
choose to control major outbreaks of disease or the consequences of a
bioterrorist attack.85 To act quickly, government officials must have
broad powers to collect information, treat the infected, and restrict the
spread of a contagion. 86 The Model Act, therefore, sets out to mod-
ernize outdated legislation in many states and assist state officials in
making quick, coordinated decisions in response to a disease outbreak
or bioterror attack. Specifically, while attempting to balance civil
liberties, the Model Act, addresses the development of emergency
plans, quarantine or isolation of sick persons, collection and reporting
of private medical information, treatment of the sick, and appropria-
tions of supplies.88
Opponents, however, argue the Model Act is flawed and the au-
thority it grants to government officials is too broad and thus subject
79. May, supra note 25, at 159-60.
80. Id. at 159.
81. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
82. Brown, supra note 8, at 98.
83. Matei, supra note 74, at 435.
84. Brown, supra note 8, at 98.
85. See id. at 96-97; May, supra note 25, at 159.
86. Brown, supra note 8, at 99-100.
87. Reich, supra note 9, at 382-83.
88. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Protecting the Public's Health in an
Era of Bioterrorism: The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, in IN THE WAKE OF
TERROR: MEDICINE AND MORTALITY IN A TIME OF CRISIS, supra note 60, at 17, 25.
20061
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to abuse.89 Further, the definition of what constitutes a public health
emergency is vague, which, in the worst case scenario, may lead to the
declaration of a public health emergency for outbreaks similar to HIV
or AIDS, whereby infected individuals could be quarantined. 9 Addi-
tionally, in light of the scare regarding the flu vaccination shortage of
2004-2005, 91 the Model Act could be invoked to confiscate precious
vaccinations and other necessary commodities prior to accurately as-
sessing the need.
However, many of the most contentious articles of the Model Act
were based on enacted California Health and Safety Code provi-
sions.92 Consequently, some in California questioned why the state
would need further measures when the Model Act largely mirrors pre-
existing California legislation.93 Despite this criticism, California As-
semblyman Keith Richman proposed legislation in 2002 based on the
Model Act. Assemblyman Richman recognized California remained
vulnerable to the twin threats of bioterror and naturally occurring in-
fectious disease.94 Moreover, considering the chaos in New Orleans
after Hurricane Katrina, California legislators should reconsider the
state's preparedness in light of the federal government's seeming in-
ability to cope with the massiveness of a future public health crisis.
89. Ronald Bayer & James Colgrove, Rights and Dangers: Bioterrorism and the Ide-
ologies of Public Health, in IN THE WAKE OF TERROR: MEDICINE AND MORTALITY IN A TIME OF
CRIsIs, supra note 60, at 51, 60-61; George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil
Liberties, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1337, 1338-39 (2002); D. George Joseph, Uses of Jacobson
v. Massachusetts in the Age of Bioterror, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 2331, 2331 (2003); May,
supra note 25, at 161. Bayer and Colgrove note, for example, that a broad coalition argued
that it was not necessary to enhance public health emergency powers. See Bayer & Colgrove,
supra, at 61. Rather, what was needed was the "imposition of constitutional limits on older
public health statutes." Id.
90. May, supra note 25, at 161.
91. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Selected Video Clips From the Satellite
Media Tour on Flu Vaccine Shortage (Oct. 26, 2004),
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/satellitetour04.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2005).
92. For instance, Article VI, section 603 of the Model Act relating to vaccinations and
treatment during a public health emergency is adapted from sections 120175, 120575, and
120605 of the California Health and Safety Code. See THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY
HEALTH POWERs ACT art. VI, § 603 (Ctr. for Law & the Pub.'s Health, Draft for Discussion
2001), available at http'//www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
93. Tara Treasurefield, Paranoid California: Can Civil Liberties Survive a Public
Health Emergency?, NORTH BAY BOHEMIAN, Mar. 28-Apr. 3, 2002, available at
http://www.metroactive.com/papers/sonoma/03.28.02/health-0213.html.
94. See generally Telephone Interview with Keith Richman, Cal. Assemblyman from
L.A., Cal. (Oct. 24, 2005).
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IV. THE MODEL ACT AND CALIFORNIA
California has long been identified as a primary target for terrorist
attacks, 95 and there have been serious questions as to whether the state
is prepared for a statewide health threat.96 Having the largest popula-
tion and largest economy in the nation, as well as being a major port
of entry for goods and travelers, 97 California is particularly susceptible
to both naturally occurring infectious disease and biological agents for
intentional release.98 Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist at-
tacks, California legislators sought to enable the state to better respond
to the threats. 9 Accordingly, despite some criticism, California As-
semblyman Keith Richman"° introduced what would have been the
state's version of the Model Act. I°1 California's proposed 2002
Emergency Health Powers Act (EHPA) and the Model Act were iden-
95. Vanessa Kaneshiro, California's Weakened Health System Easy Target for Bioter-
rorism: Experts Warn that Smallpox Would Pose Much Greater Challenge than Anthrax, THE
NEW WORLD: AMERICA'S BOARDERS IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM, http://joumalism.berkeley.edu/
ngno/reports/newworld/bioterrorism.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2005). CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH
SERV., BIOTERRORISM SURVEILLANCE & EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESPONSE PLAN, JANUARY 2002, 4
(2002), available at http://www.dhs.ca.gov/dcdc/bt/pdf/CA BTSurvEpi_Plan-2002b.pdf.
96. Miguel Bustillo, Health Network Called Unready for Bioterror, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2001, at B8; RAND CTR. FOR DOMESTIC AND INT'L HEALTH SEC., GAPS IN PUBLIC HEALTH
PREPAREDNESS: LESSONS LEARNED IN CALIFORNIA, available at http://www.rand.org/publica-
tions/RB/ RB9080/RANDRB9080.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
97. For example, nearly four million shipping containers arrived at the Port of Los An-
geles, the busiest port in the country, in 2004. PORT OF L.A., 2004 STATISTICS, available at
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/factsfiguresAnnual 
_2004.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2005).
98. CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH SERV., supra note 95, at 4-5.
99. See generally id; Telephone Interview with Keith Richman, supra note 94. As-
semblyman Richman describes the proposed Emergency Health Powers Act, which he intro-
duced in the California Assembly, as a "response to September 11, 2001, but to be applied
broadly to a public health emergency." Id.
100. At the time he introduced the Emergency Health Powers Act, Assemblyman Keith
Richman was the only doctor sitting in the California Legislature. Mimi Hall, Many States
Reject Bioterrorism Law, USA TODAY, July 22, 2002, at IA. Further, he was the only mem-
ber to hold a master's degree in Public Health. Id. For a biography of Assemblyman Keith
Richman, see Assemblyman Keith Richman: Member: Biography, http://republican.assem-
bly.ca.gov/members/index.asp?Dist=38&Lang=l &Body=Bio (last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
101. Assemb. B. 1763, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), available at
http:/www. leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_1751-
1800/ab_1763_bill_20020108_introduced.pdf. California Assemblyman Keith Richman pro-
posed the Emergency Health Powers Act in January 2002. Ctr. for Law & the Pub.'s Health,
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA): State Legislative Activity,
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/ MSEHPA%20Leg%20Activity.pdf (last visited
May 14, 2006). The bill, however, eventually died in the Assembly. Id. Assemblyman
Richman later introduced another version of the bill in January 2003, but it died in Committee
as well in February 2004. Id However, in February 2006, Assembly Richman again intro-
duced legislation aimed at protecting Californians during a public health emergency. Id.; see
infra Part V.
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tical in nearly every way."°2 However, California's 2002 legislation,
despite two amendments, 103 was never adopted. 1°4 As a result, the
state and its citizens were arguably left more vulnerable than neces-
sary to either threat. However, in February 2006, new, less provoca-
tive legislation was introduced to fill the void and eliminate the vul-
nerability. 105
A. California's Exercises in Preparedness
Like the federally coordinated exercises TOPOFF and DARK
WINTER, I the state of California also engaged in practice exercises
to prepare for the worst-case scenario."° Based on these exercises,
state authorities realized that California and its various counties were
not adequately prepared to handle a major public health emergency. 108
Authorities also did not have a plan to address the public's response to
102. Compare THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Ctr. for Law &
the Pub.'s Health, Draft for Discussion 2001), available at http'/www.publichealth-
law.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf, with Assemb. B. 1763, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2002), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_1751-1800/ab_1763_
bill_20020108_introduced.pdf. However, Assemblyman Keith Richman, believing he would
jeopardize the passage of his bill by including HIV or AIDS as one of the communicable dis-
eases, excluded it from California Assembly Bill 1763. See Keith Richards, Cal. Assemb.
Member, Responding to the Threat of Bioterrorism: Is California's Public Health System
Ready, California Health Policy Roundtable (Mar. 18, 2002), available at http://www.kaiser
network.org/health-cast/uploaded-files/3.19.02_Transcript _Bioterrorism.pdf.
103. See Assemb. B. 1763, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0 1-02/bill/asm/ab_1751 -
1800/ab_1763_bill_20020418_amendedasm.pdf (second amended version).
104. Ctr. for Law & the Pub.'s Health, supra note 101. In describing the defeat of his
bill in April 2002, California Assemblyman Keith Richman lamented that California lawmak-
ers were "already suffering from disaster amnesia. They have their heads stuck in the sand."
Hall, supra note 100 (quoting Assemblyman Richman).
105. On February 23, 2006, Assemblyman Keith Richman again proposed legislation
aimed at protecting Californians during a public health emergency. See Assemb. B. 2451,
2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-
06/bill/asm/ab_2451-1800/ab_2451_bill_ 20060223_introduced.pdf; see also infra Part V.
106. See supra Part III.A.
107. State and local officials not only conducted theoretical planning exercises, but also
practiced implementing various responses and coordinating spending to address different re-
gional threats. See generally Sabin Russell, Health Experts Ponder Pandemic, S.F. CHRON.,
May 3, 2005, at B3.
108. Telephone Interview with Keith Richman, supra note 94. Assemblyman Richman
acknowledged that much has been done since September 11, 2001 to prepare California for a
public health emergency, but he points to the findings of the Little Hoover Commission as
evidence California remains unprepared in certain areas. Id See generally LITTLE HOOVER
COMM'N, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNOR SCHWARZENEGGER (June
23, 2005), available at http://www.lhc.ca. gov/lhcdir/emergprep/report 170a.pdf.
[Vol. 42264
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either the emergency or the measures the state planned to undertake
while responding to the emergency. 109
Recently, San Diego, California, engaged in a one-day table-top
exercise 110 studying the implementation of a quarantine in San Diego
County. " ' It was noted that San Diego County had little real world
experience in dealing with a public health crisis and issues related to
quarantine. 112 The results of the San Diego exercise revealed a need
for greater collaboration between medical and non-medical personnel,
as well as civilian and military officials.113 Further, issues related to
voluntary compliance with quarantine measures were studied, and it
was determined that a loss of income during a quarantine was a great
impediment to successfully implementing a quarantine.114 While mili-
tary personnel were assured their income was guaranteed, employees
in the private sector did not receive the same assurances and were less
likely to comply with quarantine orders."5
The RAND Corporation" l6 also conducted a series of table-top ex-
ercises testing the public health response to a smallpox outbreak." 7
While each testing area was deemed to have done considerable plan-
ning for a major event, a wide range in preparedness levels remained
and "[h]ealth departments varied dramatically in their ability to rap-
109. Telephone Interview with Keith Richman, supra note 94.
110. Table-top exercises involve a collection of experts, as well as local and state offi-
cials, among others, who run through a scenario, determine how to handle the situation, and
develop plans to implement in subsequent live exercises or actual threats. Different cities and
counties in California, however, also engage in their own independent practice exercises in-
volving real-life, on-the-ground training. See, e.g., Ivy Dai, Avian Flu Seen as Threat by
Area's Health Officials, WHITHER DAILY NEWS, Jan. 29, 2005; Lois Gormley, Drill Tests
Bio-Terrorism Response, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs, Cal.), May 28, 2004, at lB.
111. Cleto DiGiovanni et al., Quarantine Stressing Voluntary Compliance, 11
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1778, 1779 (2005), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vollinoll/05-0661.htm. This exercise was conducted in
December 2004 and "emphasized voluntary compliance with home quarantine to control an
emerging infectious disease outbreak." Id. It investigated local civilian-military collabora-
tion in public health emergency management and addressed concerns civilians had about lost
income during the quarantine. Id. See also Cheryl Clark, County Seen as Especially Vulner-
able to Pandemic, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 16, 2005, at Al.
112. DiGiovanni et al., supra note 111, at 1778.
113. Id. at 1179.
114. Id. at 1778.
115. Id.
116. The RAND Corporation is a research institute based in California. See generally
History and Mission: RAND Overview, http://www.rand.org/abouthistory/ (last visited Apr.
25, 2006).
117. Nicole Lurie et al., Local Variation in Public Health Preparedness: Lessons from
California, HEALTH AFFAIRS-WEB EXCLUSIVE 341, June 2, 2004, http://content.healthaffairs.
org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.341vl. The exercise tested seven jurisdictions comprising approxi-
mately thirty-nine percent of the states' population. Id. at 343.
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idly alert the physician and hospital community to a potential out-
break.""' 8  Interestingly, in the area of communication, the seven
tested jurisdictions varied on when the public would be informed
about a major public health emergency.' 9 Some would notify the
public as soon as they began to investigate a suspicious case, while
"others would wait until a diagnosis was confirmed (days later) to
hold a press conference."' 20 Also, considering the diversity of Cali-
fornia's population, it was noted "[olne health department can com-
municate health information in nine languages, while another is not
prepared to communicate in any language except English."' 2'
Contra Costa County, California, also engaged in a recent table-
top exercise involving local and state health department officials. 22
The exercise considered the county's response to the initial outbreak
of avian influenza in the region. 23 It was determined the initial illness
was difficult to distinguish from other patients with similar symp-
toms.124 Once it was determined the fictional patient had recently re-
turned from traveling to Asia, however, a state of emergency was de-
clared and federal authorities contacted. 125
The Contra Costa County exercise and other exercises highlight
that while California has made many improvements since September
11, 2001, more needs to be done to prepare state authorities for the
eventualities of either a bioterrorist attack or a large-scale outbreak of
disease. 126 Clearly, the initial response would be local; however, the
state must be able to coordinate a large, effective response to either
type of event. This would entail early detection, continued surveil-
lance, treatment of the ill, and the implementation of both quarantine
and isolation measures. Because local public health officials and po-
lice services would be unable to independently implement a coordi-
118. Id. at 348.
119. Id. at 349.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Russell, supra note 107.
123. Id; see also L.C. Greene, Officials Brace for Avian Flu, SAN BERNARDINO SUN,
Dec. 25, 2004 (discussing the response to an avian influenza outbreak in Los Angeles, San
Bernardino, and Riverside Counties).
124. Russell, supra note 107.
125. Id.
126. See Sharon Bernstein, Southland Not Ready for Disaster, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2005, at Al (noting that despite massive spending to prepare the state for a large-scale calam-
ity, it is unprepared for a major catastrophe). See generally Matthew B. Stannard, U.S. Ill-
Prepared to Handle Bioterror Attack, Experts Warn, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 1, 2004, at Al (not-
ing a UCSD School of Medicine infectious disease specialist's comments that the nation, in-
cluding California, was not well-positioned to either fight or even detect new threats).
266 [Vol. 42
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nated system of communication, let alone a unified policy of how to
cope with potentially millions of displaced persons, 27 the state must
take the lead and act now to insure a swift, smooth response with clear
guidelines in the eventuality of a statewide threat.1 28
B. California's 2002 Proposed Emergency Health Powers Act
The legislation proposed by Assemblyman Richman in 2002 was
nearly identical to the Model Act drafted by the Center for Law and
the Public's Health. Although it never passed, the 2002 proposal con-
tains the detail needed to address a large-scale threat to the public
health. Accordingly, the 2002 proposal is examined in detail here
since it will likely serve as the basis of any future comprehensive plan,
as called for in the more general February 23, 2006 proposed legisla-
tion discussed in Part V.12 9
The proposed 2002 EHPA, if passed, would have required the
Governor of California "to appoint a Public Health Emergency Plan-
ning Commission ... that would be required to submit to the Gover-
nor a designated public health emergency plan." 130 Further, "the State
127. See Lisa McPheron & Bettye Wells Miller, Katrina: Learning from Chaos, PRESS
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Sept. 11, 2005, at A15 (noting that a bioterror attack in Los
Angeles or San Diego, California, could force residents of those cities inland, overwhelming
the region's ability to handle the emergency).
128. In November 2005, local and state authorities conducted "Golden Guardian," an
exercise involving "more than 2500 participants representing more than 120 federal state and
local agencies." Post-Katrina Readiness for Terrorist Attacks: Before the Subcomm. on Ter-
rorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of Matt Bettenhausen, Director, California Office of Homeland Security),
available at http://www6.lexisnexis.com/ publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFull
Document&orgld=656&topicld=10671&docld=l:321925523&start=2. "The Golden Guard-
ian 2005 scenario involves simultaneous attacks on critical infrastructure at sites in the San
Francisco/Oakland Bay Area and State Capitol regions." Id. While not a bioterrorism pre-
paredness exercise, the exercise will improve coordination and communication between local,
state, and federal authorities and help identify weakness in the response to terrorist attack. Id.
129. The proposed Public Health Preparedness Act, as introduced on February 23, 2006
by Assemblyman Keith Richman, calls for the development of a "comprehensive plan to pro-
vide for a coordinated, appropriate response in the event of a public health emergency." As-
semb. B. 2451, § 130505(a), 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/billlasm/ab_2451-2500/ab_2451_bill_20060223_introduced.
pdf. The 2002 legislation, although never enacted, will likely serve as the basis for any plan
developed in California.
130. Assemb. B. 1763, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess., Legislative Counsel's Digest, (Cal.
2002) (as introduced by Assemb. Member Richman on Jan. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/Ol-02/bill/asm/ab_1751-1800/ab_1763_bill 20020108_ intro-
duced.pdf. References to the EHPA are to the introduced version, rather than the amended
versions.
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Department of Health Services... [would have had] principal respon-
sibility to protect the public's health." 3'
As previously noted, the EHPA would have empowered the Gov-
ernor of California to declare a "state of public health emergency. "132
Once a public health emergency had been declared, the Governor
would possess authority to carry out a number of actions, which in-
clude (1) suspending statutory provisions regulating the conduct of
"state business [where the provisions] . . . "would prevent, hinder, or
delay action ... by the public health authority,"' 3 3 (2) utilizing state
resources "reasonably necessary to respond to the public health emer-
gency,"' 4 (3) transferring state government functions and personnel as
needed, 35 (4) mobilizing the state militia, 3 6 (5) coordinating respon-
sive action with other states, 137 and (6) seeking federal aid.38
Further, the 2002 EHPA laid out procedures by which the Gover-
nor's declaration of a public health emergency may be enforced or
terminated. "During a state of public health emergency, a public
health authority 3 9' may request assistance in enforce[ment] ... from a
public safety authority. The public safety authority may request assis-
tance from the organized militia in enforcing the orders of the public
health authority.""'' With respect to terminating the state of public
emergency, the EHPA would have laid out three separate methods.
The first is by executive order of the Governor "upon finding that the
occurrence of an illness or health condition that caused the emergency
no longer poses a high probability of a large number of deaths.' 4'
Second, the state emergency would terminate automatically if, after
131. Id.
132. Id. § 130410.
133. Id. § 130420(a); see also Reich, supra note 9, at 395.
134. Assemb. B. 1763 § 130420(b).
135. Id. § 130420(c).
136. Id. § 130420(d). The state militia is defined by section 130360 as "the California
National Guard, the army national guard, the air national guard, or any military force organ-
ized under the laws of the state." Id. § 130360.
137. Id. § 130420(e).
138. Id. § 130420(f).
139. In California, the "Department of Health Services, any local governmental agency
... responsible for protecting and preserving the public[] health . . . [or] any person that is
designated directly by the department or local governmental agency to act on [its] behalf'
would constitute the "public health authority." Id. § 130362(b).
140. Id. § 130426. The proposed EHPA defines the "public safety authority" as "the
Department of the California Highway Patrol and any local governmental agency that acts
principally to protect or preserve the public safety or any person authorized to act on behalf of
the Department of the California Highway Patrol or the local government agency." Id. §
130362(d).
141. Id. § 130430.
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thirty days, it has not been renewed by the Governor. 42 Finally, "[t]he
Legislature, by a majority vote of each house," could terminate the
declaration upon finding that the cause of the emergency or condition
no longer poses a high probability of danger. 143
Various sections of the 2002 EHPA, however, are contentious due
to the potential constitutional issues that may arise after a public
health emergency has been declared. For example, there are provi-
sions outlining the reporting, tracking, and sharing of private health
information'" the PHA could implement to detect and track the emer-
gency. 45 Healthcare providers, including pharmacists"6 and veteri-
narians, 47 for example, would be required to report all cases of sick
persons or animals that could indicate a public health emergency, as
well as unusual or increased prescription rates. 48 Based on these ini-
tial reports, the PHA may then track the reports by investigating and
identifying exposed individuals and, if need be, communicate the in-
formation to the state or federal health authorities. 149
The EHPA also outlines the "Special Powers During a State of
Public Health Emergency" with respect to "[c]ontrol of [p]roperty."' 5 °
The PHA could close, evacuate, or decontaminate any facility posing
a danger to the public health' and, further, destroy any material pos-
ing such a danger.'52 Moreover, facilities and materials, including real
estate, could be condemned, leased, or distributed in response to the
threat.'53 Specifically, private healthcare facilities could be transferred
to the authority of the PHA during the course of the danger. 54 The
PHA could also "[i]nspect, control, restrict, and regulate by rationing
and using quotas ... the use [or] sale of. . . commodities, as may be
reasonable and necessary to respond to the public health emer-
142. Id. § 130432.
143. Id. § 130434.
144. Issues related to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) are too broad to cover here. For information on such issues, see Julie Bruce, Bioter-
rorism Meets Privacy: An Analysis of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act and the
HIPAA Privacy Rule, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 75 (2003).
145. See Assemb. B. 1763 §§ 130380-130392.
146. Id. § 130382.
147. Id. § 130386.
148. Id. § 130384-13086.
149. Id. §§ 130390-130392.
150. Id. §§ 130440-130472.
151. Id. § 130440.
152. Id. § 130440(b).
153. Id. § 130442(a).
154. Id. § 130442(b).
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gency." 15 5  Finally, the PHA would have the power to control the
movement of people from afflicted or threatened areas. 156
The EHPA also details the special powers related to the "Protec-
tion of Persons"15 7 and declares the PHA "shall use every available
means to prevent the transmission of infectious disease."' 58  For in-
stance, the PHA could "perform medical examinations ... as neces-
sary" and quarantine citizens refusing to submit to examination. 59
More intrusively, the PHA could order the vaccination, 160 treatment,161
isolation, or quarantine1 62 of any individual necessary to prevent or
halt the spread of the danger.
Consequently, the lives of ordinary Californians would be drasti-
cally impacted under the proposed 2002 EHPA during a public health
emergency. Californians must recall, however, that any measures en-
acted based on the EHPA would be temporary, and, despite their criti-
cisms, the measures are designed to be invoked in rare occurrences
when the security of the state and the interests of the population are in
jeopardy.
155. Id. § 130442(c).
156. Id. § 130442(e) (discussing the control of the movement of people into and out of
any stricken area or threatened public area).
157. Id. §§ 130480-130506.
158. Id. § 130480.
159. Id. § 130482.
160. Id. § 130484. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (providing the
legal basis for allowing forced vaccination holding compulsory smallpox vaccinations had a
substantial relation to the protection of public health and safety of the state). For a discussion
on the uses of Jacobson, see Joseph, supra note 89.
161. Assemb. B. 1763 § 130486.
162. Id. §§ 130490-130504. The proposed EHPA defines "isolation" as "the physical
separation and confinement of an individual or group of individuals who are infected or rea-
sonably believed to be infected with a contagious disease or possibly contagious disease from
nonisolated individuals, to prevent or limit the transmission of the disease to nonisolated indi-
viduals." Id. § 130356(c). The proposed EHPA defines "quarantine" as
the physical separation and confinement of an individual or group of individuals
who are or may have been exposed to a contagious or possibly contagious disease
from nonquarantined individuals and who do not show signs or symptoms of the
contagious disease, to prevent or limit the transmission of the disease to nonquar-
antined individuals.
Id. § 130364. For a discussion on the use of quarantine, see Amir Zarrinpar, Quarantine, 290
MED. STUDENT J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2872, 2872 (2003). However, quarantine can be used to
discriminate against certain parts of society. For example, in 1900, the San Francisco Board
of Health quarantine power was used to quarantine Chinatown during an outbreak of the
plague. See Paul J. Edelson, Quarantine and Social Inequality, 290 MED. STUDENT J. AM.
MED. Ass'N 2874, 2874 (2003). Further, all Chinese and Japanese people were ordered quar-
antined under the notion Asians were more susceptible to the disease because they ate rice
rather than animal protein. Id.
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C. Criticism of The Emergency Health Powers Act
Considerable criticism was levied in response to California's at-
tempt to enact the 2002 legislation. 163 As such, the 2002 EHPA was
never enacted. As previously noted, however, legislation proposed in
February 2006 aimed to rectify certain criticisms of the 2002 EHPA
by drafting vague, less empowering legislation calling for the creation
of a comprehensive plan to respond to a public health emergency.
However, the comprehensive plan called for in the 2006 legislation
would likely be largely based on the proposed 2002 EHPA.
Critics of the 2002 EPHA argued existing law already accom-
plished much of what the EHPA proposed to do in the event of a
threat. 164 The Governor already had the power to declare an emer-
gency and take public property. 165 Moreover, California public health
officials were already empowered to "quarantine [the sick], vaccinate
and isolate people."'" The proposed state legislation, however, went
further than existing legislation by calling for the state Department of
Health Services (DHS) to be designated as the governmental agency
having "principal responsibility to protect the public's health" in an
emergency.167 The state DHS would be responsible for "coordinating
all matters pertaining to the public health emergency response ... dur-
163. Treasurefield, supra note 93; Aurelio Rojas, Sweeping Bioterrorism Measure Gut-
ted, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 17, 2002, at A3; Marilyn Chase, Civil-Liberties Issues Check
Plans to Fight Bioterrorism, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2002, at B 1. Various groups opposed the
bill for various reasons. As Chase specifically noted, the American Civil Liberties Union op-
posed the act for "having too broad a definition of bioterror emergency, and too narrow a set
of safeguards for due process, medical privacy, and religious objections to procedures like
cremation." Id. The American Legislative Exchange Council also opposed the act because it
"constituted an unwarranted expansion of state public-health powers and warned it would
lead to declarations of quarantine 'on the vague definition of a biological threat."' Id. As-
semblyman Richman, in a telephone interview, recalled several angry citizens telephoning his
office arguing that his proposed 2002 legislation placed far too much unchecked power in the
hands of the state government. Telephone Interview with Keith Richman, supra note 94. He
believed the criticism was unwarranted, and it was necessary to educate the public about these
criticisms and the devastating impact a public health emergency would have if not responded
to quickly. Id.
164. Treasurefield, supra note 93; Compare CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§
120125-120150 with Assemb. B. 1763 § 130490. Therefore, the similarity seems to dispel
Model Act creator Lawrence Gostin's central premise that the Model Act would "clarify am-
biguity" and modernize the existing public health laws in the various states. Parmet, supra
note 23, at 104.
165. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8625. See generally Wing, supra note 22, at 72.
166. Treasurefield, supra note 93.
167. Assemb. B. 1763, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess., Legislative Counsel's Digest (Cal.
2002), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/l l-02/billlasmlab_1751-1800/ab-1763_
bill_20020108_introduced.pdf.
23
O'Leary: Bioterrorism or Avian Influenza: California, The Model State Emer
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
ing a state of public health emergency." '68 Critics alleged this would
result in a loss of local control during an emergency.169 Considering
California's large size, public health officials believed it was impor-
tant for local authorities to declare an emergency. 170
Many of the most contentious articles of the Model Act, however,
were based on previously enacted California Health and Safety Code
provisions. 171 Consequently, critics argued California did not need
further measures, such as the Model Act, when the Model Act itself
was based on California legislation. 7 2 By going beyond preexisting
legislation, critics alleged the 2002 EHPA posed an even greater risk
to civil liberties. 173
1. Reporting, Tracking, and Sharing Health Information
Gathering and communicating private medical information raises
two issues: first, the feasibility of reporting and sharing information
during a major health crisis and, second, the constitutional issues
raised by reporting private health information to other branches of
government or outside agencies.
With respect to the first issue, the feasibility of reporting, track-
ing, and sharing private health information during a major public
health emergency, information gathered by healthcare workers may
not be as important as other pressing issues, such as security. For in-
stance, the declaration of a public health emergency in the Gulf re-
gion 174 after Hurricane Katrina was imposed to prevent the possible
outbreak of disease. 175 However, empowering the reporting, tracking,
and sharing of private health information is highly questionable in a
lawless society unable to establish basic security on the streets. 76
168. Id.
169. Treasurefield, supra note 93.
170. Id. It is commonly recognized that local authorities and health care providers
would be the first to identify either an outbreak of infectious disease or the consequences of a
bioterror attack. Cimons, supra note 78.
171. See supra note 92.
172. Treasurefield, supra note 93.
173. Id.
174. See supra note 19, discussing the territorial issues involved in the federal govern-
ment declaring a state of public health emergency.
175. Susan B. Glasser & Michael Grunwald, The Steady Buildup to a City's Chaos,
WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2005, at Al.
176. See Donald R. Winslow, Photojournalists Covering Katrina Fall Victim to Grow-
ing Violence, Chaos, NATIONAL PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASSOCIATION, Sept. 8, 2005,
http://www.nppa.org/ news-and eventsnews/2005/09/hurricane2.html; see also SIMON, supra
note 30, at 359 (discussing the crisis atmosphere resulting from a bioterror attack in the
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Second, the constitutional issues raised by reporting and commu-
nicating private health information, traditionally protected by the pa-
tient-doctor privilege, are of great concern to many opponents.' 77
Case law, however, permits the collection of private health informa-
tion under Whalen v. Roe.'78 Whalen is a 1977 case permitting a state
health authority to maintain computerized files of patients receiving
specific prescriptions. 79 The basis for the Court's determination was
that the computerized lists could only be accessed by a limited number
of people who have a legitimate interest in the information.'80 Critics
contend, however, that computer technology advances in the last thirty
years, the advent of the internet, and the ease with which even the
most secure government databases can be hacked,18" ' pose a danger to
an individual's right to privacy.
Accordingly, under the 2002 proposed EHPA, healthcare workers
and state authorities would have the legal ability to gather, track, and
share private health information during a public health emergency. 182
2. Quarantine, Isolation, Vaccination: The Case Law
Critics also allege the protection of persons provisions under the
Model Act or the 2002 EHPA impinge upon the basic constitutional
rights of individuals, such as the freedom of movement.'83 However,
considering the severity of the emergency under which the EHPA
would be used, the security of the state and the nation may be threat-
ened, thereby warranting such impingement."8 Individuals, therefore,
must forgo some of their constitutional rights during this type of
emergency with the understanding the rights will be restored once the
United States).
177. See generally May, supra note 25, at 161.
178. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding a New York statute granting the
state's health authority the power to maintain computer files containing the names and ad-
dresses of people obtaining controlled substances with a physician's prescription).
179. Id. at 591.
180. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
181. Cyber Security and the US Economy: Hearing Before the J. Economic Comm,
107th Cong., (2001) (statement of Lawrence K. Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer, Sci-
ence and Technology, National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency), available
at http://www.house.gov/jec/hearings/gershwin.pdf.
182. See generally Assemb. B. 1763, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess., §§ 130370-130388
(Cal. 2002), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asrn/ab_1751-
1800/ab_1763 bill_20020108_introduced.pdf.
183. See Matei, supra note 74, at 443-44.
184. "If somebody had small pox and insisted on congregating, it would be insane not
to quarantine." Id. at 447 (quoting Lawrence Gostin).
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threat has passed. To ensure the survival of those rights, they may
have to be relinquished temporarily while combating a large-scale
health emergency.
Once the Governor declares a public health emergency, critics ar-
gue citizens, sick or not, may suffer the abuses of their government in
the name of security.'85 Questions about the extent to which authori-
ties would go to enforce the measures to protect persons abound. 186
For example, would armed guards be used to enforce a quarantine?
Could they use live ammunition, or even deadly force, to protect the
rest of society? 187  Again, considering the scope of the Hurricane
Katrina and the clear inability of law enforcement personnel to cope
with the initial lawlessness, 88 would use of force in the event of a
public health emergency be warranted? Moreover, with respect to re-
ceiving medical treatment, individuals have "a constitutional right to
refuse treatment based on the concept of bodily integrity."' 18 9
Once a declaration of public health emergency has been made, the
PHA would have broad power to exercise authority over the private
property of an individual or business, as well as power to restrict the
freedom of movement of infected and uninfected people alike. 190 The
basis for many of the most controversial articles of the Model Act,
however, is the California Health and Safety Code. 191 Furthermore,
measures, such as quarantine, isolation, and vaccination, have been
upheld as valid exercises of a state's public health powers during a
public health emergency. 192
Several federal and California cases address the lengths to which
officials may go, under both state and federal constitutions, during a
public health emergency. In the realm of vaccinations, the Court in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts addressed the issue of compulsory vacci-
nation. 193 The Court held that, with respect to smallpox (and pre-
185. Id. at 442-44.
186. See Warren Vieth, President Cites Flu Epidemic Risk, Suggests Role for Troops,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at A10; Matei, supra note 74, at 442.
187. See Vieth, supra note 186 (discussing the military and National Guard's role dur-
ing a pandemic).
188. Winslow, supra note 176.
189. Reich, supra note 9, at 402.
190. See Matei, supra note 74, at 438, 442-43, 447.
191. For example, see the legislative history portion of THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY
HEALTH POWERS ACT art. VI, §§ 604-05 (Ctr. for Law & the Pub.'s Health, Draft for Discus-
sion 2001), available at http//www.publichealthlaw. net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf
192. See Joseph, supra note 89.
193. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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sumably other contagious infections), a state had the right to order its
citizens to be compulsorily vaccinated. 194
In the area of quarantine, a California appellate court in In re
Martin struggled with the issue of what constituted reasonable cause
to quarantine a person suspected of being ill, and thereby justifying a
deprivation of an individual's personal liberty. 195 Martin involved pe-
titioners who were arrested and subsequently had bail fixed.' 96 Their
release was refused, however, when the local health officer ordered
them quarantined based on the reputation of the rooming house where
petitioners were arrested as a house of prostitution and a suspicion that
petitioners may have been infected with a venereal disease.197
The court noted health officers had the duty to "take all measures
necessary to prevent the transmission of venereal disease and . . .
[were] vested with full power of quarantine."' 9 8 Moreover, the court
noted, "whether or not a quarantine order is justified depends upon the
facts of each individual case."' 99 Thus, looking at the facts, the court
noted the health officer knew the premises were regarded as a house
of prostitution; the rooming house contained paraphernalia associated
with prostitution; there were reports that venereal disease had been
contracted on the premises; arrests for prostitution had been made at
the address; and, despite the fact petitioners were not originally ar-
rested on prostitution charges, they claimed to have engaged in the
practice in the past.2" The court, therefore, concluded there was rea-
sonable cause to quarantine petitioners based on their association with
the house, the history of infection originating there, and their state-
ments they had engaged in high-risk behavior.2°'
Additionally, despite petitioners' argument that reasonable cause
to continue the quarantine no longer existed, the court held a person
may be detained for a period of time to determine if there was actual
infection.2° Here, the court noted medication or the use of local disin-
fectants may have temporarily masked the outbreak of infection.2 °3
194. Id. at 39; Joseph, supra note 89.
195. In re Martin, 188 P.2d 287, 289-90 (Cal. 1948). See generally Krista Maglen,
Politics of Quarantine in the 19th Century, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2873 (2003).
196. Martin, 188 P.2d at 289.
197. Id. 289-90.
198. Id. at 289.
199. Id. at 290.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 290-91.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 291.
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Thus deprived of medication or sexual contact through quarantine, it
could be determined if petitioners were infected or not.2°4
In his dissent, Presiding Justice Adams wrote that only one per-
son, the arresting officer, was aware of the house's reputation, which
was not enough to base the court's finding of reasonable cause to
quarantine. 205 He also noted the reports of individuals contracting in-
fection at the house was "hearsay of the rankest kind," and, further,
the men involved were not quarantined z.21 6 He concluded, "Even a
prostitute is entitled to the protection" of the right to liberty and there
was no showing of reasonable cause to believe petitioners were in-
fected and thus subject to quarantine.2 7
In re Halko is another California appellate decision addressing
quarantine and isolation.2 8 In Halko, the petitioner was diagnosed
with tuberculosis, and, after being served with an order isolating him
at Mira Loma Hospital, he fled the institution. 209 The petitioner "was
subsequently arrested, tried, and convicted" of a misdemeanor.1 °
"Prior to serving the jail sentence the petitioner was served with an-
other order of isolation ... 1. 12 He was ordered back to the hospital
where he was subsequently served with four consecutive isolation or-
ders.21 2 The petitioner later sought a writ of habeas corpus "con-
tend[ing] the right of the health officer to issue [four] consecutive cer-
tificates of quarantine and isolation for periods of six months each,
'without means of questioning and judicially determining' the conclu-
sion of the health officer, results in 'continually depriving one of his
liberty.'213 However, the Halko court disagreed.214
Using similar language as Martin, the Halko court noted health
officers may "use every available means to ascertain the existence of,
and immediately to investigate, all reported or suspected cases of tu-
berculosis in the infectious stage . . . and to ascertain the sources of
such infection. '215 Further, health officers can make isolation or quar-
antine orders when they determine it is necessary to protect the pub-
204. Id. at 290-91.
205. Id. at 294 (Adams, P.J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 298.
208. In re Halko, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1966).
209. Id. at 662.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
28
California Western Law Review, Vol. 42 [2005], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol42/iss2/4
BIO-TERRORISM OR AVIAN INFLUENZA
lic. 216 The order is to be written, giving the name of the person, the
time or duration of the order, "the place of isolation or quarantine, and
such other terms and conditions as may be necessary to protect the
public health. ' 217 Moreover, the Halko court, quoting the California
Supreme Court, declared it was "well-recognized" that "one of the
first duties of a state" is to protect "the health and comfort of its" citi-
zens.2 8 Further, the state may act using its police power to take action
through "drastic measures" to "eliminat[e] ...disease, whether in
human beings," animals, or crops.219 The court presumed, however,
"the legislature has carefully investigated and has properly determined
that the interests of the public require legislation that will insure the
public safety and the public health against threatened danger from"
disease. 2 ° Thus, in Halko, the court determined the health officer was
empowered to issue consecutive orders for quarantine "so long as any
person continues to be infected with [a disease] and on reasonable
grounds is believed by the health officer to be dangerous to the public
health. 221
A more recent example of the court's deference to the legislature
comes from Love v. the Superior Court of San Francisco, where the
court was asked to determine the constitutionality of AIDS testing.222
The petitioners were arrested for soliciting an act of prostitution and
ordered to undergo AIDS testing.223 They argued that the testing,
based on the California Penal Code "violate[d] their Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable searches" and seizures.224
In addressing the petitioner's Fourth Amendment challenge, the
court noted compulsory blood testing was a "search[] subject to the
Fourth Amendment. ' '22 However, it was "undisputed that the control
of a communicable disease is a valid exercise of the state's police
power. '226 Thus, where the state exercises its police power to test for
the protection of the public health, the court balances the "special
216. Id. at 662-63.
217. Id.
218. Id. (quoting Patrick v. Riley, 287 P. 455, 456 (Cal. 1930)).
219. Id. (quoting Patrick, 287 P. at 456).
220. Id. (quoting Patrick, 287 P. at 456).
221. Id. at 664.
222. Love v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660, 661-62 (App. Ct.
1990).
223. Id.
224. Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (discussing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6).
225. Id. (quoting Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 675 (1990) and
Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
226. Id.
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governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,"
against "the individual's privacy expectations . . . to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of indi-
vidualized suspicion. 2 7
Thus, the court examined the statute requiring the AIDS testing
and determined that, despite a failure of the statute section to specifi-
cally declare a purpose, the purpose could nonetheless be gleaned
from "the provisions of the act, the legislative history of the act and
recent findings of the Legislature regarding AIDS and AIDS test-
ing. 228 In looking to the legislative history, the court noted that "[i]n
1986, the Legislature declared that '[t]he rapidly spreading AIDS epi-
demic poses an unprecedented major public health crisis in California,
and threatens, in one way or another, the life and health of every Cali-
fornian. "'229 In looking at the petitioner's privacy expectations, the
court noted drawing blood was a minimal intrusion 3.2 °  Therefore,
when balanced with the state's desire to stem the spread of AIDS, the
court upheld the testing requirement.231
As applied today, in the areas of quarantine, isolation, and vacci-
nation, courts have upheld the state's power to exercise drastic meas-
ures during a public health emergency to protect the public.232 With
respect to vaccination, if a public health emergency were declared in
the event of an avian influenza outbreak, presumably once a vaccine
was developed, the state could order the vaccination of the entire
population.233 Further, with respect to quarantine, an individual can be
quarantined based on his or her association with a particular location,
a home or apartment, or, presumably, a condominium or business, if
that location is reputed to be a source of infection.234 The quarantined
227. Id. at 662-63 (quoting Treasury Employees v. Van Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989)). The special needs doctrine originated when the Court upheld mandatory blood,
urine, and breath testing of railroad employees for alcohol and drugs. Skinner, 489 U.S. at
606, 620, 633. In California, the Johnetta J. court upheld an AIDS test of a suspect who bit a
police officer, though there was no probable cause or individualized suspicion to believe the
suspect had AIDS. Johnetta J., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
228. Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
229. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 199.45
(West 1988)).
230. Id. at 664-65 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602 ; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957). The court noted that blood tests were minimally intrusive, commonplace, required
only a small amount of blood to be extracted, involved no risk, trauma, or pain, and had be-
come basically routine in everyday life. Id.
231. Id. at 666.
232. See id. at 662.
233. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
234. See In re Matrin, 188 P.2d 287, 291 (Cal. 1948).
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person may also be held for a period long enough for symptoms to
present themselves. 235 Thus, the state's police power to restrict a per-
son's liberty and freedom of movement is well established in the case
of a public health emergency. Further, with respect to testing for in-
fection, an individual would be required to submit to testing.236 Again,
using avian influenza as an example, a blood test could determine the
presence of the H5N1 virus in a person suspected of having the virus.
Similar to AIDS testing, testing for H5N1 would presumably be up-
held, given the potential magnitude of the outbreak. Therefore, based
on earlier precedent, Californians would experience restrictions of
their civil liberties during either a large-scale bioterrorist attack or
outbreak of naturally occurring infectious disease.
Consequently, the measures contained in the 2002 EHPA would
likely be upheld in both state and federal courts. Therefore, the best
way to protect drastic encroachment upon civil liberties is to pass a
revised version of the EHPA, which contains specific, enumerated
protections. However, due to criticisms and fear, the California As-
sembly is now considering a new, vague, and less comprehensive pro-
posal devoid of all but the most general protections of civil liberties.
V. FEBRUARY 23, 2006: THE PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS ACT
On February 23, 2006, Assemblyman Keith Richman, author of
the 2002 EHPA, proposed a new measure designed to protect Califor-
nians during a public health emergency. The proposed bill, entitled
the Public Health Preparedness Act (PHPA), calls for the creation of a
comprehensive plan and speaks generally about "ensure[ing] that the
needs of infected or exposed persons are properly addressed" and that
state and local officials have the "ability to prevent, detect, and man-
age health threats. '237 The new proposal, however, is far shorter and
less detailed than the 2002 EHPA. The reason being; the shorter, less
detailed 2006 proposal is clearly designed to pass the Assembly and as
such, gently nudge Californians into accepting the more comprehen-
sive measures outlined in the 2002 EHPA. Moreover, the 2006 pro-
posal, like the 2002 EHPA, also lacks clear, enumerated protections
for civil rights.
235. Id. at 289-90.
236. See Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 666 (requiring AIDS testing).
237. Assemb. B. 2451, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 130505(a)-(c) (Cal. 2006), avail-
able at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_2451-2500/ab_2451_bill_20060223_intro
duced.pdf.
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The 2006 PHPA casually proclaims that "government should do
more to protect the health, safety, and general well-being of [Califor-
nians] ,' 238 enumerating in general terms the means by which to ac-
complish this goal. For instance, the Secretary of California Health
and Human Services shall prepare a plan addressing procedures for
notifying and communicating with the public during a public health
emergency; 2 9 procedures for the "central coordination of resources,
personal, and services";' "[a] process for effective reporting, track-
ing, and surveillance of diseases";241 a procedure for "efficient evacua-
tion" of people;24 2 and a process for vaccinating people during a public
health emergency.24 3
The only reference in the PHPA to civil liberties declares that
"[t]he rights of the people to liberty, bodily integrity, and privacy dur-
ing a public health emergency should be respected to the fullest extent
possible, consistent with maintaining and preserving the public's
health and security."2' Like the 2002 EHPA, the 2006 PHPA lacks
the specific language necessary to give the public confidence in the
legislation by enumerating specific protections of their civil liberties.
As such, the PHPA merely calls for government officials to for-
mulate procedures, compile lists, and identify methods to combat an
emergency. The language is uncontroversial and noncommittal. Once
enacted, however, state health officials will be required to draft a
comprehensive plan designed to protect the state during an emer-
gency. That plan will likely be based on the detailed, more controver-
sial language found in the 2002 California EHPA or even the Model
Act itself. Consequently, the 2006 PHPA is merely a means to secure
the same ends as the 2002 EPHA, namely a clear, detailed piece of
legislation with the purpose of protecting the health of all Califor-
nians.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
California must do more to ensure it is better prepared to cope
with a bioterror attack or the widespread outbreak of an infectious dis-
238. Id. § l(a)
239. Id. § 130510(a)(1).
240. Id. § 130510(a)(3).
241. Id. § 130510(a)(6).
242. Id. § 130510(a)(8)
243. Id. § 130510(a)(10).
244. Id. § 1(0.
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ease, such as avian influenza, or risk social chaos.245 California au-
thorities must also work to ensure that, despite any subsequent social
unrest, civil liberties are protected during a major public health emer-
gency. The best way to protect these liberties is to enshrine the-pub-
lic's rights and the procedures to protect those rights in the legislation
drafted to respond to a statewide public health emergency. While
there are a number of areas where the state can improve its level of
preparedness for a major crisis, while protecting the rights of its citi-
zens,2" the single best way to implement these recommendations is to
enact legislation based on the Model Act.
A. Enact Specific Constitutional Protections
To protect Californians faced with either a bioterror attack or in-
fectious disease outbreak, California simply must enact legislation
similar to the Model Act. However, there are many areas within the
Model Act that require substantial improvement, particularly in the
area protecting of civil liberties. While Assemblyman Richman at-
tempted to have legislation passed in 2002 to protect Californians dur-
245. As an example of the social and political impact an outbreak of infectious disease
could have on the government of California, some have argued that the most severe social and
political crisis the Chinese government faced since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre was
in 2003 during the SARS outbreak. Osterholm, supra note 51, at 24-29. More than likely,
the intentional release of a biological agent could have the same impact, depending upon the
success of releasing the agent and the length of time it has to spread among the population of
a large city like Los Angeles, California, before being recognized and contained. See Stan-
nard, supra note 126.
246. For example, the state needs to better train local healthcare providers and other
first responders in identifying unusual health threats. Local doctors, nurses, paramedics, and
police officers are most likely to be the first witnesses to either a bioterror attack or the initial
stages of an outbreak of infectious disease. Cimons, supra note 78. As the California DHS
noted, anthrax, plague, smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers, and brucella pose the most likely
bioterror threat. CAL. DEP'T OF HEALTH SERV., supra note 95, at 5. Thus, training in identify-
ing these agents, their symptoms in humans, and methods of containing any outbreak must be
implemented on a greater scale. Moreover, increasing hospital surge capacity is paramount.
During the SARS outbreak in Toronto in 2003, for example, one infected person could have
contact with up to one hundred people, all of whom then needed a medical evaluation.
Weinstein, supra note 10, at 2334. Thus, hospitals were inundated with potential cases of
SARS, leaving medical staff overwhelmed and playing catch-up. See id. Further, as an ex-
ample in California, a 1998 outbreak of influenza revealed the healthcare system in California
was unable to cope with the increase in cases stemming from an outbreak. Khan & Ashford,
supra note 4, at 288. This outbreak, part of the yearly, predictable influenza outbreak, high-
lighted the shortcomings in funding, beds, and staffing. Id.; see Bustillo, supra note 96. Fi-
nally, better communication between and among medical personal and state and local authori-
ties is needed to better coordinate a response during an event. See Nancy Vogel, California
Vulnerable to Outbreak, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at B 1. For a detailed analysis of Califor-
nia's strengths and weaknesses with respect to public health threats, see generally Little Hoo-
ver Commission, supra note 108.
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ing a major public health emergency, 247 future legislation must go be-
yond enumerating the authority granted to the state and contain spe-
cific protections for civil rights, rather than merely mentioning civil
liberties. 248 Legislation outlining the reasons for isolation or vaccina-
tion, for example, must be included. The procedure for issuing isola-
tion or quarantine orders, measures for appealing those orders, and the
length of time those orders are to remain in effect should be provided.
Moreover, mechanisms for reviewing complaints or abuses must be
included.
The general nature of the 2006 PHPA currently under considera-
tion moves in the wrong direction. Its provisions are far too general,
and, again, it contains no enumerated protections for civil liberties.
B. Train Judges2 49
All California judges should be informed that in the event of a
biological attack or infectious disease outbreak, they will likely be
called upon to make swift decisions regarding fundamental constitu-
tional rights. Consequently, they should note the current law with re-
spect to vaccinating the public, isolating the ill, and quarantining sus-
pected cases. Moreover, given the special circumstances that may
exist during the public health emergency, 20 judges should prepare
themselves for unconventional hearings." Judges or their personnel
247. See generally Assemblyman Keith Richman, The Bioterrorism Fiasco: One Year
After Anthrax Mailings, the State Has Done Little to Prepare for Attacks (October 2002),
http://republican.assembly.ca.gov/members/index.aspDist=38&Lang=1 &Body--Opinion
Editorials&ReflD-45 1.
248. Assemb. B. 1763, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. pmbl. § 2(a)(9) (Cal. 2002), avail-
able at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_1751-1800/ab_1763_bill_20020108
_introduced.pdf (noting "the rights of people to liberty, bodily integrity, and privacy must be
respected to the fullest extent possible, consistent with maintaining and preserving the pub-
lic's health and security").
249. Assemblyman Keith Richman included a provision in his proposed 2002 EHPA
legislation calling for attorneys, licensed to practice law in California, to be trained as special
judges to handle isolation and quarantine issues during a public health emergency. Assemb.
B. 1763 § 130372(a)(7) (as amended Apr. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_1751-1800/ab_1763_bill_20020403_amend
edasm.html. In the 2006 PHPA, as amended on April 18, 2006, this provision was elimi-
nated. Assemb. B. 2451, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 130510(a)(7) (Cal. 2006), available
at http//www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_2451-2500/ab_2451_bill_20060223_introdu
ced. pdf.
250. For example, during the 1918-1919 influenza outbreak, some California courts
held sessions outside to reduce the potential for infection. See ALFRED W. CROSBY,
AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA OF 1918,111 (1999).
251. During the SARS outbreak in Toronto in 2003, police detained one man suspected
of being infected with SARS and transported him to a hospital quarantine facility. Ian B.
Cowan, The Day SARS Came to Town: The Court's Role in Preventing Epidemics, 39 Cr.
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should identify alternative locations for holding court and consider
measures to restrict the spread of any contagion, such as limiting the
number of public observers or requiring all admittees to wear masks
and wash their hands before and after attending court.
Consequently, a select few judges from each county should be
designated special health "emergency judges" to address issues of
forced quarantine or vaccinations.252 These judges would take the lead
and inform their colleagues of what to expect during a large-scale
public health emergency. They should also be ready for immediate,
prolonged duty during this period. Measures for training judges and
selecting health emergency judges should, therefore, be included in
future public health emergency legislation.
C. Establish an Advisory Council During an Emergency
Once a public health emergency has been declared, preselected
advisors should also convene to advise the Governor and other state
authorities. While not empowered to counter the Governor's response
to the emergency, the advisors would operate as a check on egregious
misuse of authority during an emergency and also as an outlet for pub-
lic concerns. Advisors should be selected from prominent legal posi-
tions throughout the state and have a background in public health,
medicine, and constitutional law. Their purpose would be solely to
address issues of civil liberties during the declaration of an emergency
and to ensure public concerns about restrictions are heard and con-
veyed to the Governor. The method by which advisors are selected,
the number of advisors, and their specific role during an emergency
should be written into any future public health emergency legislation.
Moreover, once the emergency is over and the Governor's author-
ity under the emergency health legislation is terminated, there should
be an immediate state level investigation into the response and the re-
strictions on civil liberties. Additionally, there should be a focus on
voluntary citizen compliance with the measures enacted during the
REv. 4 (2003). Later, the lawyers and judge conducted a telephone hearing. Id. The case,
however, became moot because the medical officer later withdrew his quarantine order after
determining the individual had not been exposed to SARS. Id. The quarantined man, none-
theless, had been subject to forcible confinement for three days. Id. Such prolonged, forcible
confinement must be prevented during an extended emergency, because voluntary public
compliance with quarantine and isolation measures is unlikely to continue when they perceive
a threat to their freedom or property. See also Mark A. Rothstein, Are Traditional Public
Health Strategies Consistent with Contemporary American Values?, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 175,
192 (2004).
252. Treasurefield, supra note 93.
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emergency to ensure greater compliance in a future emergency. This
investigation or review procedure should also be included in future
public health emergency legislation.
D. Voluntary Compliance by the Public
After the SARS outbreak, polls were conducted in the United
States to forecast voluntary compliance with quarantine measures.2 3
The polls indicated that between eight and twenty-five percent of the
American population would not voluntarily comply with the quaran-
tine orders during a SARS-like outbreak. 254  This rate was much
higher than in affected Asian countries or in Canada.255 Consequently,
something must be done to ensure greater voluntary civilian compli-
ance with measures implemented to combat a public health emer-
gency.
One of the best ways to ensure broad voluntary compliance is to
inform the public of the danger.256 Therefore, the state must broadcast
information using all types of media, 257 establish toll-free numbers
state residents can contact to receive current information in their area,
and include public opinion-in the form of the advisory committee to
the Governor-in the response to the threat. 258  Essentially, the state
253. Rothstein, supra note 251, at 190.
254. Id.
255. Id. Rothstein describes the United States as a nation of "Lone Rangers," steeped in
individualism, self-reliance, and non-conformity. Id. at 190. He contrasts an American re-
sponse to a SARS-like outbreak with the Asian response in that, generally, Asian cultures
emphasize family unity and frown upon individualism and non-conformity. See id.
256. The public must have a sense of control and they must be kept informed. Large-
scale terrorist attacks, like those that may compel a declaration of a public health emergency
in California, may exact a psychiatric toll on a large portion of the general population. See
Lynne Lamberg, Terrorism Assails Nation's Psyche, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 544, 544-45
(2005). Often, post-traumatic stress lingers after witnessing or experiencing such an attack.
Id. One can only imagine the stress associated with being informed a large-scale bioterror
attack occurred in a large metropolitan city, like Los Angeles, California, coupled with meas-
ures preventing movement from one region of the state to another, quarantine, or even forced
vaccination. Such stress may prompt some individuals to act out of extreme anxiety. Thus,
communicating the potential risk and the necessity of abiding by precautionary measures is
imperative in giving people sense of control. Id. at 546.
257. As noted with the Swine Flu threat, the role of the media is vital. During the
threat, the media was instrumental in undermining public support for the vaccination program
with exaggerations of side effects of the vaccination. See NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note
13, at 127-29.
258. See generally Childress, supra note 60, at 88-89. During the SARS outbreak in
Toronto, for example, there was confusion in the way information was presented. C. David
Naylor et al., Learning from SARS in Hong Kong and Toronto, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 2483,
2484-85 (2004). Due to overlapping authority and confused lines of communication, press
briefings had three to four different spokespersons, resulting in a major criticism of Toronto's
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must treat the public as a partner in the fight against the emergency
rather than as a non-participant or as an obstacle.25 9 Additionally, the
public must be reminded the authority granted to the governor and
state officials is temporary and there are clearly enumerated methods
of checking and terminating that authority.
Furthermore, as was made evident in the December 2004 table-
top exercise in San Diego26 and to a certain degree during the SARS
outbreak in Canada,26' certain members of the public will shun the
quarantine orders. Accordingly, any future public health emergency
legislation must include tax breaks and other incentives for people not
to return to work during a major, protracted public health emergency.
People should not be drawn together in large numbers conducive to
the spread of any contagion during such an emergency; thus, emphasis
on internet commerce, telecommuting, and other methods of working
at home must be strongly encouraged. The public should also be re-
minded that going to work puts them, their families, and their cowork-
ers at risk of infection.
Encouraging the public to take these actions and informing them
prior to the declaration of a public health emergency will likely result
in greater compliance and continued respect for government authority,
rather than forcing these measures on an unwilling, untrusting pub-
lic.
2 62
VII. CONCLUSION
With the continuing threat of bioterrorism in the post-September
11 world, the spread of avian influenza to Europe, and the realization
that the federal government is unable to handle a large-scale natural
disaster, California authorities must implement legislation similar to
the 2002 EHPA. Additionally, in light of the initial devastation, the
subsequent violence and looting, the threat of disease, and the uncoor-
dinated recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina, California authorities
must rethink the state's own level of preparedness for a public health
emergency. 63 However, greater protections must be included in the
efforts to convey information to the public. Id.
259. Childress, supra note 60, at 89.
260. See supra Part IV.A.
261. Rajiv Sekhri, Ontario Asks Residents to Obey SARS Quarantine, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRiB., June 3, 2003, at Al 1.
262. See Clayton L. Thomason, It's a Small World After All: Global Health and the
Ethical Lessons of SARS, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 313, 319 (2004).
263. "Hurricane Katrina showed us many things and there was a real lack of prepared-
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legislation to protect the public's civil liberties. Rather than the cur-
sory references to civil liberties and antidiscrimination in the 2002
EHPA proposal,2" strong language must be included in a new act to
protect individual privacy and property rights. Specific measures to
guide authorities in protecting these basic rights will encourage the
public to comply with enacted legislation in a public health emer-
gency. Moreover, with clear guidelines, authorities will be better pre-
pared to handle the legal, and possibly violent, challenges to state au-
thority, specifically if the duration of the public health emergency is
prolonged. 65 Unfortunately, the 2006 PHPA does not contain the
specific provisions necessary to guide authorities during a public
health emergency, nor the language to insure the protection of civil
liberties.
ness on the part of the Federal government. Look at the placement of supplies, management
systems, chain-of-command issues between federal and state officials. Overall there was a
real lack of preparation." Telephone Interview with Keith Richman, supra note 94.
264. Assemb. B. 1763, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess., pmbl. § 2(a)(8) (Cal. 2002), avail-
able at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/l1-02/billlasmlab_1751-1800/ab_1763_bill_20020
108 introduced.pdf.
265. Again, estimates on the possible duration of a pandemic of avian influenza are be-
tween twelve to thirty-six months. Osterholm, supra note 51, at 24-26. Consequently, Cali-
fornia must be prepared for initial social acceptance of the restrictions accompanying the dec-
laration of a public health emergency. However, after six to eight months, the public may be
less willing to abide by state authority and continued restrictions. See generally Thomason,
supra note 262, at 319.
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